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Abortion and the “Woman Question”:
Forty Years of Debate
__________________________
Addison C. Harris Lecture
September 27, 2012

REVA B. SIEGEL*
Today we equate constitutional democracy with the basic principle that every
adult citizen is entitled to vote, but this was not true at the founding. At the
founding voting was a privilege possessed by the few, not the many. And it was a
privilege possessed by men, not women. It took seventy-five years of debate for
women to secure the right to vote1 during which time the question of woman
suffrage was referred to simply as the “woman question.”2 The debate over woman
suffrage was referred to as the woman question because the debate over woman
suffrage raised fundamental questions about women’s roles, nature, and place in the
constitutional order.
Voting is no longer the site of struggle over the woman question. Yet this
society has not settled the woman question. Instead, it has continued to debate the
woman question in new contexts. For the last four decades, abortion has been the
site of struggles over the woman question, just as, for decades, schools were the site
of struggles over the race question, or today the institution of marriage is the site of
struggles over the standing of gays and lesbians.
This lecture commemorates Roe’s fortieth anniversary by reconstructing how
the woman question became entangled in the abortion debate in the twentieth
century. The abortion debate is commonly thought to concern the question of when
life begins. But the question of when life begins is not the only question that makes
the abortion debate explosive. I will show how the entrance of women’s rights
claims into the abortion debate fatefully changed it, and led opponents of abortion
to engage the woman question in terms that have changed shape over the last
several decades, from the frames of “pro-family” to the more contemporary
discourse associated with claims that “abortion hurts women.” Tracing the fourdecade arc of this conversation allows us to see more clearly the many forms in

* Nicholas deB. Katzenbach Professor of Law, Yale University. This paper was
presented as the Harris Lecture at the Indiana University Maurer School of Law. It also
benefited from a presentation at Princeton University. I was fortunate to have the research
assistance of Marissa Doran and Jeff Love.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. See generally Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The
Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947
(2002).
2. See, e.g., ELIZABETH K. HELSINGER, ROBIN LAUTERBACH SHEETS & WILLIAM
VEEDER, THE WOMAN QUESTION–SOCIAL ISSUES, 1837–1883 (1983); Francis Parkman, The
Woman Question, 129 N. AM. REV. 303 (1879); Julia Ward Howe, Lucy Stone, Thomas
Wentworth Higginson, Elizabeth Cady Stanton & Wendell Phillips, The Other Side of the
Woman Question, 129 N. AM. REV. 413 (1879); Charles Nordhoff, A Tilt at the Woman’s
Question, HARPER’S NEW MONTHLY MAG., Feb. 1863, at 350.
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which the “woman question” can be expressed in cases that will reach the Roberts
Court in the coming decade.
I. BEFORE ROE
Abortion and contraception were lawful at the time of this country’s founding,
and then criminalized, state by state, in the mid- to late-nineteenth century.3 For the
century thereafter, no woman could have an abortion unless a doctor declared that it
was necessary to save her “life”—a term sometimes construed generously to
include physical and mental health, for those women who had money and
connections to the “right” doctor.4
A campaign to reform the laws criminalizing abortion began in the 1960s, well
before mobilization of the second-wave feminist movement. The campaign was not
conducted in the name of women’s rights. Instead, the drive to reform abortion law
was led by doctors advancing concerns of public health. Public health advocates
emphasized that laws criminalizing abortion subjected women to risk of death and
infertility, pointing out that these risks disproportionately harmed poor women and
women of color, who could not afford to pay the “right” doctor or to travel to a
jurisdiction where abortion was legal.5 If the public health case for abortion reform
raised questions of equality, it was to argue that abortion laws ought to be the same
for wealthy women and poor women, white women and women of color. The
public health case also focused on dilemmas faced by pregnant women who
contracted measles or accidentally ingested toxins such as thalidomide, known to
induce severe fetal malformation.6
Initially, at least, public health advocates did not challenge the criminalization of
abortion. Rather they offered paternalist justifications for expanding and codifying
exceptions to the criminal ban. Public health advocates helped enact laws allowing
women to obtain an abortion if women could persuade a committee of doctors that
certain excusing “indications” were present: that abortion was necessary for the
pregnant woman’s physical or mental health, or that the pregnancy was the result of
rape, or that the fetus was severely impaired.7

3. See JAMES C. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF
NATIONAL POLICY, 1800–1900, at 29–30 (1978). The nineteenth century campaign to
criminalize abortion was advanced in the interest of protecting unborn life, enforcing gender
roles in marriage, and preserving the racial character of the nation. See Reva B. Siegel,
Reasoning From the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions
of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 280–323 (1992).
4. See LESLIE REAGAN, WHEN ABORTION WAS A CRIME: WOMEN, MEDICINE, AND LAW
IN THE UNITED STATES, 1867–1973, at 16, 193 (1997).
5. See id. at 138; Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Before (and After) Roe v.
Wade: New Questions About Backlash, 120 YALE L.J. 2028, 2036–38 (2011).
6. See LESLIE J. REAGAN, DANGEROUS PREGNANCIES: MOTHERS, DISABILITIES, AND
ABORTION IN MODERN AMERICA 60–63 (2010); Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 5, at 2037.
7. Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 5, at 2037–38. By the 1960s, the American Law
Institute had adopted a model statute that would permit abortion—with a doctor’s
certification—in such cases. MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3 (Proposed Official Draft 1962),
reprinted in BEFORE ROE V. WADE: VOICES THAT SHAPED THE ABORTION DEBATE BEFORE
THE SUPREME COURT’S RULING 24, 24–25 (Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2d ed.
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Over the course of the 1960s, a number of states, many in the South, enacted
“indications” laws liberalizing exceptions to criminal bans on abortion.8 By 1970,
four states, most prominently New York, enacted “periodic” legislation that
allowed abortion in early pregnancy, without restriction as to reason or
justification.9
But by 1970, the range of arguments for decriminalizing abortion had
multiplied. Advocates in a nascent environmental movement concerned about
scarce resources and an overpopulated planet were advocating separating sex and
procreation as a public-regarding practice;10 while, on other fronts, a “sexual
revolution” was transforming norms concerning extramarital intimacy.11 Advocates
in each of these movements supported liberalizing access to abortion.
A. Feminist Arguments for Abortion Rights
In this period, a newly mobilizing women’s movement, growing from the ranks
of the civil rights movement, from the antiwar movement, and from the labor
movement, also began to make arguments for decriminalizing abortion, of a wholly
new kind. As women argued about the gender justice of the market, the family, and
the political sphere, they came to understand the criminalization of abortion in new
ways. In this new feminist framing, abortion was a symptom and symbol of an
unjust and unequal society, a society that enforced a double standard for women in
sex, in family roles, in the work place, and in politics.
2012) [hereinafter BEFORE ROE V. WADE].
A majority of Americans supported such reforms. See DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY
AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF ROE V. WADE 302–03 (1994);
Austin C. Wehrwein, Abortion Reform Supported in Poll: Most Catholics Are Found to
Favor Liberalization, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1966, at 83 (finding support for decriminalizing
abortion for ALI-type justifications, including “[h]ealth, 71 per cent; rape, 56 per cent;
deformed baby, 55 per cent; low income, 21 per cent; unmarried, 18 per cent; birth control,
15 per cent”).
8. Twelve states, most of them in the South, enacted laws along the ALI
(“therapeutic”) model. See Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 5, at 2047.
9. Id.
10. See, e.g., Brochure, Zero Population Growth, reprinted in BEFORE ROE V. WADE,
supra note 7, at 55, 55–57 (declaring that, to protect the Earth from the ecological strain of
overpopulation, “no responsible family should have more than two children” and that “[a]ll
methods of birth control, including legalized abortion, should be freely available—and at no
cost in poverty cases”); PAUL R. EHRLICH, THE POPULATION BOMB 148 (1968) (warning of
the threat that an overpopulated planet posed to the environment, and arguing for policies
that would separate sex and reproduction for the public good).
11. See generally Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 5, at 2039–41; DAVID ALLYN, MAKE
LOVE, NOT WAR: THE SEXUAL REVOLUTION (2000); JANE F. GERHARD, DESIRING
REVOLUTION: SECOND-WAVE FEMINISM AND THE REWRITING OF AMERICAN SEXUAL
THOUGHT, 1920 TO 1982 (2001); Laurie Ouellette, Inventing the Cosmo Girl: Class Identity
and Girl-Style American Dreams, 21 MEDIA, CULTURE & SOC’Y 359, 361 (1999) (noting that
Helen Gurley Brown’s Sex and the Single Girl, which advised unmarried women how to
have fulfilling sex lives, sold over two million copies after it came out in 1962); Judy
Klemesrud, An Arrangement: Living Together for Convenience, Security, Sex, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 4, 1968, at 40 (discussing the increasing prevalence of the “arrangement”—
nonmarried, college-student couples living together).
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When Betty Friedan addressed a convention called to found the National
Abortion Rights Action League in 1969, she titled her remarks Abortion: A New
Civil Right:
Women are denigrated in this country, because women are not
deciding the conditions of their own society and their own lives.
Women are not taken seriously as people. Women are not seen
seriously as people. So this is the new name of the game on the
question of abortion: that women’s voices are heard.
. . . [W]omen are the ones who therefore must decide, and what we
are in the process of doing, it seems to me, is realizing that there are
certain rights that have never been defined as rights, that are essential to
equality for women, and they were not defined in the Constitution of
this, or any country, when that Constitution was written only by men.
The right of woman to control her reproductive process must be
established as a basic and valuable human civil right not to be denied or
abridged by the state.12
Feminists saw laws criminalizing abortion as denying women’s “dignity”13:
depriving women of control over their sexual and family lives, and denying women
the ability to combine sex and family with education, work, and public life—as
men do. They sought a voice for women—in the decision whether and when to bear
a child, and in the making of laws that would control such decisions. Women had
the ethical capacity to wrestle with conflicting dimensions of the abortion decision:
they could weigh concerns of the unborn, of existing children, of their partners, as
well as their own claims and needs. “[T]his is the new name of the game on the
question of abortion,” Friedan argued. “[T]hat women’s voices are heard.”14 To
ensure this, feminists claimed, for the first time, a constitutional right for women—
not a doctor or the state—to control the decision whether a woman would carry a
pregnancy to term.
The claim that women were entitled to control decisions concerning their
reproductive lives was an integral part of a larger claim for gender justice. In 1970,
the women’s movement held a nationwide “Strike for Equality”15 on the halfcentury anniversary of the Nineteenth Amendment’s ratification in which the
movement sought ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA)16 alongside

12. Betty Friedan, Founding President, Nat’l Org. for Women, Address Before the First
National Conference on Abortion Laws: Abortion: A Woman’s Civil Right (Feb. 1969), as
reprinted in BEFORE ROE V. WADE, supra note 7, at 38, 38–39 (omission in original).
13. Id. at 39.
14. Id.
15. See Betty Friedan, Call to Women’s Strike for Equality (Aug. 26, 1970) (previously
unpublished manuscript), as reprinted in BEFORE ROE V. WADE, supra note 7, at 41, 42.
16. The Equal Rights Amendment was a proposed constitutional amendment that would
have provided, in relevant part, that “[e]quality of rights under the law shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.” H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong.
(1971). It passed both houses of Congress in 1972, but was not ratified by the required
number of states before the deadline mandated by Congress, largely as a result of
conservative opposition.
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three other claims: (1) equal employment opportunity, (2) publicly supported child
care, and (3) abortion “on demand,”17 by which feminists meant, not access to
abortion on a whim, but rather access to abortion without having to give reasons or
seek the permission of a committee of doctors. On the half-century anniversary of
woman suffrage, the movement imagined equal citizenship for women as requiring
transformation in the conditions in which women conceive and rear children.
B. Opposition
The entrance of feminists into the abortion debate both increased support for
liberalization of abortion laws and energized opposition. Over time, the
antiabortion position was articulated in ways that became progressively more
engaged with the feminist case for abortion rights, with many in the right to life
movement initially opposing feminist arguments and then increasingly seeming to
incorporate feminist argument into the case against abortion.
In the 1960s, before entrance of feminists into the debate, abortion reform was
most often opposed by Catholics.18 (In the 1960s, most Protestant denominations—
including evangelicals such as the Southern Baptists—accepted the case for
therapeutic abortion, and distanced themselves from the abortion issue, which they
viewed as a “Catholic issue.”19) Catholic convictions about abortion rested on
views about unborn life and about sex. The Church emphasized that sex was for the
sacred purpose of creating life, and did not support women’s interest in engaging in
sexual relations and retaining control of decisions whether and when to parent.20
But Catholics opposing abortion in the public arena did not focus on the procreative
ends of sex. In the public arena, Catholics mobilized to oppose any exception to
criminal bans on abortion—for maternal health or rape—on the ground that
abortion is the taking of a human life.21 They endeavored to translate that view—

17. Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and
Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1372–76
(2006); see also BEFORE ROE V. WADE, supra note 7, at 249–50.
18. See generally Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 5, at 2048–49, 2063–64.
19. Id. at 2063.
20. For example, Humanae Vitae, an encyclical promulgated in 1968, condemned
contraception and abortion together as contrary to a Catholic understanding of marriage.
Encyclical Letter of the Supreme Paul VI on the Regulation of Birth (July 25, 1968),
available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/paul_vi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-vi_enc
_25071968_humanae-vitae_en.html. The encyclical declared that the human “sexual
faculties” are “concerned by their very nature with the generation of life, of which God is the
source,” and reaffirmed a doctrine of marriage in which the purpose of sex between husband
and wife was procreation, writing that “the direct interruption of the generative process
already begun and, above all, all direct abortion, even for therapeutic reasons, are to be
absolutely excluded as lawful means of regulating the number of children.” Id. “Similarly
excluded is any action which either before, at the moment of, or after sexual intercourse, is
specifically intended to prevent procreation—whether as an end or as means.” Id.
21. For example, Robert Byrn, a law professor at Fordham University who would soon
join the National Right to Life Committee, appealed to science and civil rights in attacking
ALI indications legislation expanding abortion exceptions for rape and health of the mother.
He attacked the legislation on the grounds that “an abortion kills an innocent human being,”
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which in the 1960s other Christian denominations did not fully share22—into
secular terms. For example, Jack Willke, the first leader of the National Right to
Life Committee, began his career as a sex education counselor teaching chastity
before marriage.23 But in his role as head of the National Right to Life Committee,
Willke expressed the argument against abortion in terms that seemly had little to do
with sexual abstinence before marriage. Willke helped pioneer the use of
photographs of fetuses in antiabortion argument,24 and appealed to scientific and
ethical arguments to argue in his bestselling Handbook on Abortion that if the fetus
is “human, he (or she) must be granted the same dignity and protection of his life,
health, and well being that our western civilization has always granted to every
other human person.”25 The Handbook largely avoided discussion of evolving
views about sex,26 and did not directly engage with the feminist case for abortion
rights, which was audible by the time of the Handbook’s publication.
By the early 1970s, new voices began to join the National Right to Life
Committee in opposing abortion, and these newcomers to the abortion debate
began more openly to attack feminist arguments for the abortion right. In the 1972
Presidential election, President Richard Nixon, who initially took policy positions
supportive of liberalization, reversed course and called for restrictions on abortion
in terms directed at Catholic audiences and in language sounding in “the sanctity of
human life.”27 The strategy was designed to attract and realign Catholics, who

and in terms evoking science and civil rights law, argued that “the minority, whose rights are
at stake, is both voiceless and voteless.” For one such attack, see Robert M. Byrn, Abortion
in Perspective, 5 DUQ. L. REV. 125, 132, 141 (1967).
22. See, e.g., Southern Baptist Convention, Resolution on Abortion (June 1971),
reprinted in BEFORE ROE V. WADE, supra note 7, at 71, 71–72 (adopting statement calling on
Southern Baptists to work for legislation to permit abortion “under such conditions as rape,
incest, clear evidence of fetal deformity, and carefully ascertained evidence of the likelihood
of damage to the emotional, mental, and physical health of the mother”).
23. On Willke’s early career as a sex educator counseling abstinence outside of
marriage, see Cynthia Gorney, The Dispassion of John C. Willke, WASH. POST MAG., Apr.
22, 1990, at 20, 25.
24. In the 1970s, Jack Willke first drew on new photographic technologies to pioneer
antiabortion argument through pictures of the embryo/fetus in utero—a technique that he and
others perfected in ensuing decades. Id. at 24.
25. J.C. WILLKE & BARBARA WILLKE, HANDBOOK ON ABORTION (1971), as reprinted in
BEFORE ROE V. WADE, supra note 7, at 99, 101–02.
26. The Handbook discusses sex in a passage arguing against rape exceptions in laws
criminalizing abortion. It suggests that pregnancy resulting from rape is “extremely rare” and
can be prevented by medical douche, if the victim immediately seeks medical attention. Id.
at 104. The Handbook goes on to suggest that women fabricate many rape claims. “As
everyone knows, there are many degrees of resistance or consent on the part of a woman to
the act of intercourse. It is easy for a woman rejected by a lover to then accuse him of raping
her.” Id. at 105. Willke has continued to maintain that raped women are not likely to
conceive, observing in 2012 that rape “is a traumatic thing—she’s, shall we say, she’s
uptight. She is frightened, tight, and so on. And sperm, if deposited in her vagina, are less
likely to be able to fertilize. The tubes are spastic.” Pam Belluck, Health Experts Dismiss
Assertions on Rape, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2012, at A13.
27. Statement About Policy on Abortions at Military Base Hospitals in the United
States, 3 PUB. PAPERS 500 (Apr. 3, 1971).
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historically voted with the Democratic Party.28 As the campaign progressed,
however, Nixon widened his attack on abortion, expressing it in terms designed to
appeal not only to Catholics, but to a more broad-based “silent majority,” voters the
Nixon campaign believed were concerned about the threat that young people in the
antiwar, sexual liberation, and women’s movements posed to traditional family
values.29
This reframing advanced a new kind of objection to abortion. In August of 1972,
Kevin Phillips, author of The Emerging Republican Majority30 and a key architect
of the Republican Party’s “Southern Strategy,”31 published a New York Times
Magazine article entitled “How Nixon Will Win.”32 In it, Phillips promised that
Republicans would “aggressively” attack “social morality,” warning that in the fall
campaign Republicans would be “tagging McGovern as ‘the triple A candidate—
Acid, Amnesty and Abortion,’” and observing that “tactics like this will help link
McGovern to a culture and morality that is anathema to Middle America.”33
The “triple A” objection to abortion did not concern the question of when life
begins. The “triple A” objection to abortion was not that abortion was murder, but
instead was that “abortion rights (like the demand for amnesty) validated a
breakdown of traditional roles that required men to be prepared to kill and die in
war and women to save themselves for marriage and . . . motherhood.”34 In the
“triple A” framing, abortion stands for gender trouble.

28. See Kevin Phillips, How Nixon Will Win, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 6, 1972, § 6, at 8
(predicting a Republican victory in 1972 premised on the strategy of “wooing conservative
Catholics,” among other socially conservative demographic groups).
29. The Nixon campaign saw the strategic benefit in invoking abortion for its power in
signaling social conservatism; staking out a position on abortion itself appeared to offer little
benefit. See generally Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 5, at 2056–59. On August 28, 1972,
campaign strategists sent John Ehrlichman “data showing ‘a sizeable majority of Americans,
including Roman Catholics, now favoring liberal abortion laws,’” and “[t]he president
decided to leave [the] matter to the states, . . . privately affirm[ing] that ‘abortion reform’
was ‘not proper gr[oun]d for Fed[eral] action’” and that he “‘[wou]ld never take action as
P[resident].’” DEAN J. KOTLOWSKI, NIXON’S CIVIL RIGHTS: POLITICS, PRINCIPLE, AND POLICY
251 & n.222 (2001).
30. KEVIN P. PHILLIPS, THE EMERGING REPUBLICAN MAJORITY (1969).
31. James Boyd, Nixon’s Southern Strategy: ‘It’s All in the Charts,’ N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
May 17, 1970, at 25 (profiling Phillips and detailing his role in crafting the Republican
demographic strategy of the early 1970s).
32. Phillips, supra note 28, at 8.
33. Id. Pursuing such themes, Buchanan spearheaded letter-writing campaigns, such as
one in Michigan in September of 1972, targeting every newspaper in the state of Michigan,
“especially . . . every Catholic newspaper in the State,” urging Michigan voters, who would
vote on an abortion reform referendum on election day, to reject “abortion-on-demand” and
reject McGovern, the candidate who supported “unrestricted abortion policies.” Memorandum
from Pat Buchanan to Betty Nolan (Sept. 11, 1972), in Hearings Before the S. Select Comm. on
Presidential Campaign Activities, 93d Cong. 4256, 4256–57 (1973). For an account of the
campaign in Michigan in 1972, see Robert N. Karrer, The Formation of Michigan’s AntiAbortion Movement 1967-1974, MICH. HIST. REV., Spring 1996, at 67, 76–85.
34. BEFORE ROE V. WADE, supra note 7, at 257; see also KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND
THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 193 (1984) (demonstrating through interviews of movement
leaders that “this round of the abortion debate is so passionate and hard-fought because it is a
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Drawing on the same sets of associations—between abortion and feminism—
Phyllis Schlafly drew abortion into the campaign against the Equal Rights
Amendment. Schlafly’s first published attack on the ERA in February of 1972
complained:
Women’s lib is a total assault on the role of the American woman as
wife and mother and on the family as the basic unit of society.
Women’s libbers are trying to make wives and mothers unhappy with
their career, make them feel that they are “second-class citizens” and
“abject slaves.” Women’s libbers are promoting free sex instead of the
“slavery” of marriage. They are promoting Federal “day-care centers”
for babies instead of homes. They are promoting abortions instead of
families.35
II. ABORTION AND THE WOMAN QUESTION AFTER ROE:
PRO-LIFE? PRO-FAMILY? PRO-WOMAN?
The entrance of feminists into the abortion debate changed its shape. Some
opponents of abortion embraced tenets of feminism,36 but many opponents of
abortion also opposed feminism, expressing their views in multi-issue
organizations and from inside the Republican Party. These alliances soon resulted
in the formation of a “pro-family” movement opposed to abortion and to many
goals of second-wave feminism. Over decades of conflict, however, antiabortion
groups began to integrate “pro-woman” arguments into their case against abortion,
often infusing “pro-woman” or “women’s rights” talk with traditional, stereotypical
modes of reasoning about women.
A. The Association of Antiabortion and Antifeminist Argument
The Republican Party’s “triple A” argument and Schlafly’s anti-ERA argument
sounded themes that flowered in the post-Roe period. Schlafly played an important
role in forging a new form of “pro-family” argument that fused antiabortion and
antifeminist frames. In 1977, in Houston, Schlafly organized a national convention
to oppose the Equal Rights Amendment at which an emergent pro-family
movement protested the abortion and gay rights planks of feminists who came out
to support the ERA.37 As Rosemary Thomson, one of Schlafly’s organizers, warned
referendum on the place and meaning of motherhood” (emphasis omitted)); Robert Post &
Reva B. Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 373, 418–20 (2007).
35. Phyllis Schlafly, Women’s Libbers Do NOT Speak for Us, PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY REP.,
Feb. 1972, reprinted in BEFORE ROE V. WADE, supra note 7, at 218, 219.
36. Of those who mobilized to oppose abortion, there were some who were active in
feminist circles and others who adapted feminist frames to antiabortion ends. For an account
that explores the views of those who presented themselves as pro-life feminists, see Mary
Ziegler, Women’s Rights on the Right: The History and Stakes of Modern Pro-Life
Feminism, 28 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 232 (2013).
37. See Siegel, supra note 17, at 1401; Marjorie J. Spruill, Gender and America’s Right
Turn, in RIGHTWARD BOUND: MAKING AMERICA CONSERVATIVE IN THE 1970S 71, 71 (Bruce
J. Schulman & Julian E. Zelizer eds., 2008) (making the case that the International Women’s
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the following year in The Price of Liberty, “The national leaders of the women’s
movement, who were working so hard to ratify ERA, were the same clique
promoting homosexual rights, abortion, and government child rearing.”38 (Here, as
in the “triple A” argument, the wrong of abortion is gender trouble, not murder.) In
1979, Beverly LaHaye consolidated these associations by founding Concerned
Women for America, which organized large numbers of evangelical Protestants
against abortion and the ERA.39 The pro-family frame explosively connected
opposition to abortion and to the ERA. The pro-family case against abortion rights
was advanced by multi-issue groups such as Schlafly’s Eagle Forum and Beverly
LaHaye’s Concerned Women for America.40
The pro-family argument against abortion reached even wider audiences as
Richard Viguerie and Paul Weyrich honed pro-family frames as an organizing tool
for the Republican Party. In the late 1970s, Viguerie and Weyrich led the New
Right to mobilize around “social issues”—including race, religion, and the
family—with the aim of recruiting traditional Democratic voters and realigning
them in the ranks of the Republican Party.41 Reagan’s 1980 election was a result
Year (IWY) “contribut[ed] significantly to the rightward turn in American politics as social
conservatives began rallying around gender issues”); Judy Klemesrud, Equal Rights Plan and
Abortion Are Opposed by 15,000 at Rally, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1977, at 32 (describing, on the
occasion of the 1977 Houston Convention marking IWY, a counter-rally sponsored by the ProFamily Coalition that “unanimously passed resolutions against abortion, the proposed equal
rights amendment and lesbian rights, three issues that will also be debated at the women’s
conference”); Allen Hunter, Virtue with a Vengeance: The Pro-Family Politics of the New
Right 159–68 (1985) (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Brandeis University) (on file with
author) (analyzing the “pro-family” rhetoric and practices of the New Right, including the
antifeminist mobilization around the IWY). Afterward, Phyllis Schlafly recalled:
At the IWY event in Houston, the ERAers, the abortionists, and the lesbians made
the decision to march in unison for their common goals. The conference
enthusiastically passed what the media called the “hot button” issues: ERA,
abortion and abortion funding, and lesbian and gay rights. The IWY Conference
doomed ERA because it showed the television audience that ERA and the
feminist movement were outside the mainstream of America. ERA never passed
anywhere in the post-IWY period.
Phyllis Schlafly, A Short History of E.R.A., EAGLE FORUM, http://www.eagleforum.org/psr
/1986/sept86/psrsep86.html.
38. ROSEMARY THOMSON, THE PRICE OF LIBERTY 15 (1978). For more on Thomson’s role,
see DONALD T. CRITCHLOW, PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY AND GRASSROOTS CONSERVATISM: A
WOMAN’S CRUSADE 245 (2005).
39. See SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAW: RELIGIOUS VOICES AND THE
CONSTITUTION IN MODERN AMERICA 133–37 (2010) (describing what the author calls Beverly
LaHaye’s “holy war” against, in LaHaye’s words, “Bella Abzug, Gloria Steinem, and Betty
Friedan” and quoting one LaHaye follower as declaring that “[i]t’s time now to pick up my
skillet and my rolling pin and charge”); BEVERLY LAHAYE, WHO BUT A WOMAN? 25, 27 (1984)
(connecting the ERA with abortion, child care, and gay rights).
40. See generally Mark J. Rozell & Clyde Wilcox, Second Coming: The Strategies of the
New Christian Right, 111 POL. SCI. Q. 271 (1996).
41. Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 5, at 2083 (citing The New Right: A Special Report,
CONSERVATIVE DIG., Jun. 1979, at 10); see also Daniel K. Williams, The GOP’s Abortion
Strategy: Why Pro-Choice Republicans Became Pro-Life in the 1970s, 23 J. POL’Y HIST. 513,
532–34 (2011).
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not only of the “Southern Strategy,” but of an argument tying abortion to the
woman question, through pro-family frames forged by the New Right.42 The
Republican Party platform of 1980 provided, “We will work for the appointment of
judges at all levels of the judiciary who respect traditional family values and the
sanctity of innocent human life.”43 The platform plank associated and equated
pro-life and pro-family causes—and was repeated verbatim for years thereafter.44
B. “Pro-Woman”: The Emergence of Woman-Protective Antiabortion Argument
To this point, we have seen how the appearance of feminist arguments for the
liberalization of abortion law led to the emergence of new forms of antiabortion
argument. Increasingly, the fetus-centered pro-life argument of the kind that Jack
Willke pioneered was coupled with pro-family argument, so that protecting unborn
life became a way of talking about opposing the Equal Rights Amendment and the
feminist vision of the family. The Republican Party platform of 1980 illustrated this
increasingly common conjunction of antiabortion and antifeminist argument when
it called for judges who would vindicate “traditional family values and the sanctity
of innocent human life.”45 In the ensuing years, there was fierce conflict between
the feminist movement and those mobilized under the pro-life and pro-family
banners.
This conflict itself was ultimately to shape antiabortion argument. Despite the
insurgency of the New Right, three Republican administrations, and associated
Supreme Court appointments, “traditional family values and the sanctity of
innocent human life”46 did not trump claims of women’s equal citizenship. In 1992,
by all appearances close to overturning Roe, the Supreme Court instead reaffirmed
and narrowed Roe in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.47 Several months later the
nation elected Bill Clinton, its first strongly pro-choice president.48

42. See Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 5, at 2061–71; see also Williams, supra note
41, at 532–34.
43. REPUBLICAN NAT’L COMM., REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM OF 1980 (1980),
available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25844.
44. See Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions
Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1750 n.159 (2008).
45. Id.
46. REPUBLICAN NAT’L COMM., supra note 43.
47. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
48. See Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Real World of Constitutional Rights: The Supreme
Court and the Implementation of the Abortion Decisions, in PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF
AMERICAN POLITICS: CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS 174, 185 (Samuel Kernell &
Steven S. Smith eds., 5th ed. 2013) (describing President Clinton as “the first pro-choice
president since Roe,” recounting the numerous policies he implemented immediately after
his election, and contrasting his positions on abortion to his predecessors’); see also Robin
Toner, Political Memo; Clinton’s Support of Abortion Rights Has Catholic Leaders on a
Tightrope, N.Y. TIMES. (Feb. 3, 1993), http://www.nytimes.com/1993/02/03/us/political
-memo-clinton-s-support-abortion-rights-has-catholic-leaders-tightrope.html (stating that
President Clinton “chose, as one of his first acts, to begin to roll back 12 years of Republican
abortion restrictions, and he has promised to do more”).
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In the face of these setbacks, growing numbers of abortion opponents changed
course. Instead of opposing feminist initiatives, opponents of abortion began
instead to assert themselves as true defenders of women’s rights. In the process,
they incorporated feminist frames into antiabortion argument, taking these claims
deep inside the case against abortion itself. During the 1990s, antiabortion
advocates began to argue that in order to protect women’s health and freedom, it
was necessary to criminalize abortion.49 Those who opposed abortion increasingly
coupled fetal-protective arguments with claims that abortion hurt women and that
women who chose abortions did so because they were coerced. Antiabortion
advocates began to make arguments for criminalizing abortion to protect women.50
We can see this decision to supplement fetal-protective arguments with appeals
to woman-protective justifications for restricting abortion in the career of Jack
Willke, head of the National Right to Life Committee. Willke pioneered
fetal-focused arguments in the 1970s51 and honed this mode of advocacy
throughout the 1980s, but embraced woman-protective antiabortion arguments in
the early 1990s after opinion polling persuaded him that advancing claims about
women’s rights and welfare would help him win the uncommitted ambivalent
middle. Here is Willke, writing in 2001, recalling his conversion:
We had been making steady progress . . . [in] educating the nation,
beyond reasonable doubt, that human life, in its complete form, began
at the first cell stage.
...
Then pro-abortion activists . . . changed the question. No longer was
our nation arguing about killing babies. The focus, through their efforts,
had shifted off the humanity of the unborn child to one of women’s
rights. They developed the effective phrase of “Who Decides?”
...
Pro-lifers were still teaching in the traditional method that they had
brought such astounding and continuing success until that time. They
were still proving that this was a baby and telling how abortion killed
the baby. However, increasingly, these facts fell on deaf ears, for this
did not address the new argument of women’s rights. This had to be
answered, but we did not know what the effective answer was.
...
After considerable research, we found out that the answer to their
“choice” argument was a relatively simple straightforward one. We had
to convince the public that we were compassionate to women.
Accordingly, we test marketed variations of this theme. Thus was born
the slogan “Love Them Both,” and, in fact, the third edition of our
Question and Answer book has been so titled, specifically for that
reason.52

49. Reva B. Siegel, The Right’s Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and the Spread of
Woman-Protective Anti-Abortion Argument, 57 DUKE L.J. 1641, 1667–73 (2008).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1669–70.
52. J.C. Willke, Life Issues Institute Is Celebrating Ten Years With a New Home, LIFE
ISSUES CONNECTOR, Feb. 2001, at 1, 1, 4, available at http://www.lifeissues.org/connector
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During this same period, David Reardon developed the new woman-protective
argument in ways self-consciously designed to align antiabortion argument with
feminist frames, in a new “pro-woman” strategy: “[W]e must insist that the proper
frame for the abortion issue is not women’s rights versus the unborn’s rights, but
rather women’s and children’s rights versus the schemes of exploiters and the
profits of the abortion industry.”53 Reardon squarely addressed the reservations of
advocates who opposed abortion out of concern for the unborn:
While committed pro-lifers may be more comfortable with traditional
“defend the baby” arguments, we must recognize that many in our
society are too morally immature to understand this argument. They
must be led to it. And the best way to lead them to it is by first helping
them to see that abortion does not help women, but only makes their
lives worse.54
Of course, to make this claim about women’s interests persuasive, Reardon
needed some explanation for the large numbers of women seeking abortions. How
would using the criminal law to control women help women? Reardon’s response
was to insist that women who have abortions do not in fact want them; they are
coerced into the procedure or do not grasp its implications—a claim he made
persuasive by invoking paternalist imagery of women. Reardon explained,
“Candidates must learn to project themselves as both pro-woman and pro-life. This
is done by emphasizing one’s knowledge of the dangers of abortion and the threat
of women being coerced into unwanted abortions by others.”55
In the 1970s and 1980s, pro-life advocates often associated opposition to
abortion with opposition to feminism. But by the 1990s, the antiabortion movement
increasingly began to appropriate feminist frames and to integrate them into the
/01feb.html (narrating how the Life Issues Institute “became a launching pad, nationally and
internationally, for a new dynamic in pro-life education . . . [that] showcase[d] just how
compassionate the movement is to women”); see also JOHN C. WILLKE & BARBARA H.
WILLKE, WHY NOT LOVE THEM BOTH? QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT ABORTION (1997);
John & Barbara Willke, Why Can’t We Love Them Both?, in LIFE AND LEARNING VII:
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTH UNIVERSITY FACULTY FOR LIFE CONFERENCE, JUNE 1997 AT
LOYOLA COLLEGE 10, 10 (Joseph W. Koterski, ed., 1998) (“My message tonight is not what I
said five or ten years ago. Five or ten years ago my emphasis would have been on the right to
life and on saving babies. But now I want to tell those who are involved in women’s helping
centers that they are doing what I believe is the most important single thing that the pro-life
movement is doing in our time. The big problem is that we have not publicized it enough—
it’s a light hidden under a bushel—and so my message will be very direct. We’ve got to go
out and sing from the housetops about what we’re doing—how compassionate we are to
women, how we are helping women—not just babies, but also women.”).
53. David Reardon, Politically Correct vs. Politically Smart: Why Politicians Should be
Both Pro-Woman and Pro-Life, POST-ABORTION REV., Fall 1994 (emphasis omitted),
available at http://www.afterabortion.info/PAR/V2/n3/PROWOMAN.htm.
54. Id. at 3.
55. David C. Reardon, Pro-Woman/Pro-Life Campaign, POST-ABORTION REV., Winter
1993, available at http://www.afterabortion.info/PAR/V1/n1/prowoman.htm; see also
Siegel, supra note 49, at 1672–76 (providing background on David Reardon). For an
illustration of woman protective arguments, see, for example, Siegel, supra note 44, at 1731,
1781–82.
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very substance of antiabortion argument itself, fusing feminist and genderconventional claims about women. These new synthetic woman-protective
arguments raise deep questions about who women are. Drawing on highly
controverted science,56 antiabortion advocates have argued that a woman who
decides to end a pregnancy will suffer trauma or breast cancer or commit suicide,
and that her choice is likely the product of coercion.57 They argue that only
criminalizing abortion can protect women’s health and freedom. Pro-choicers
respond by arguing that these claims persuade—if they do—because they trade in
junk science and stereotypes about women’s nature. The criminal law offers little
support for the genuinely difficult circumstances in which women make family
decisions; there must be other and better ways of protecting women’s health and
freedom than the criminalization of abortion.58
III. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLITICS:
THE WOMAN QUESTION IN THE CASE LAW, ROE TO CARHART AND BEYOND
Our constitutional case law reflects the contours of this several-decades-long
struggle over the woman question. In 1973, when the Court decided Roe,59
feminists had only recently joined the abortion debate. In fact, the Court that
decided Roe understood the abortion question as a question of public health and
doctors’ professional autonomy, scarcely grasping the women’s rights claim.60 The
Court’s 1992 decision in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey,61 reaffirming and significantly limiting Roe, reflects much more clearly than
Roe the views of feminist and antiabortion antagonists in the abortion debate. In
reaffirming and narrowing Roe, Casey enlarges Roe’s normative basis. The portion
of the Casey decision attributed to Justice Kennedy identifies the equality values
that freedom to decide about family roles secures for women:
Her suffering is too intimate and personal for the State to insist, without
more, upon its own vision of the woman’s role, however dominant that
vision has been in the course of our history and our culture. The destiny
of the woman must be shaped to a large extent on her own conception
of her spiritual imperatives and her place in society.62

56. For studies challenging the empirical basis of claims that abortion causes clinically
significant psychological harms and breast cancer, see Siegel, supra note 44, at 1719 n.81.
57. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 44, at 1732 n.106 (quoting SOUTH DAKOTA TASK FORCE
TO STUDY ABORTION, REPORT OF THE SOUTH DAKOTA TASK FORCE TO STUDY ABORTION 43–
52 (2005) (asserting that a woman who chooses abortion is likely to “suffer[] significant
psychological trauma and distress,” including bipolar disorder, post-traumatic stress
disorder, and breast cancer)).
58. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 44, at 1793–98.
59. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
60. See Reva B. Siegel, Roe’s Roots: The Women’s Rights Claims That Engendered
Roe, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1875, 1896–900 (2010).
61. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
62. Id. at 852.
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Casey ties constitutional protection for women’s abortion decision to the
understanding, forged in the Court’s sex discrimination cases, that government
cannot use law to enforce traditional sex roles on women.63 This is an
understanding of the abortion right absent in Roe.
At the same time, Casey adopts an undue burden test that sanctions regulation of
the abortion right throughout pregnancy to promote the state’s interest in protecting
potential life, so long as such regulation informs without hindering a woman’s
choice whether to continue a pregnancy.64 The Court’s aim seems to be to allow
citizens who oppose abortion opportunities to express that view to women
throughout pregnancy that Roe did not accommodate.65
The Court’s 2007 Carhart66 decision upholding the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban
Act67 reflects the emergence of debate over the woman-protective antiabortion
argument. The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act was plainly designed with concerns
about unborn life in view—although the legislation was incremental rather than
absolute in protecting unborn life—regulating how abortion could be performed,
not whether.68
In the course of upholding the statute, Justice Kennedy included language in the
opinion suggesting he might be open to woman-protective arguments expressed in
some amicus briefs.69 This in turn prompted Justice Ginsburg and the three other
dissenting Justices to challenge Justice Kennedy’s reasoning, with an express
appeal to the Court’s equal protection/sex discrimination cases. While Casey
interpreted the Due Process Clause with attention to equality values, in Carhart
four Justices appealed to the Court’s equal protection decisions as a basis for
constitutional protections for the abortion right.70 Justice Ginsburg and the
dissenters challenged woman-protective antiabortion arguments, in an express
appeal to sex equality:
As Casey comprehended, at stake in cases challenging abortion
restrictions is a woman’s “control over her [own] destiny. . . . Women,
it is now acknowledged, have the talent, capacity, and right “to
participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation.” Their
ability to realize their full potential, the Court recognized, is intimately
connected to “their ability to control their reproductive lives.” Thus,

63. See Reva B. Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive Rights: Their Critical
Basis and Evolving Constitutional Expression, 56 EMORY L.J. 815, 831 (2007).
64. Casey, 505 U.S. at 876.
65. Post & Siegel, supra note 34, at 428–29.
66. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
67. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006).
68. Siegel, supra note 44, at 1707–09 (discussing the genesis of the Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act).
69. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 159 (“While we find no reliable data to measure the
phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their choice
to abort the infant life they once created and sustained.”); see, e.g., Brief of Sandra Cano,
The Former “Mary Doe” of Doe v. Bolton, and 180 Women Injured by Abortion as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 22–24, Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (No. 05-380).
70. For discussion, see Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Equality Arguments for
Abortion Rights, 60 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 160 (2013).
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legal challenges to undue restrictions on abortion procedures do not
seek to vindicate some generalized notion of privacy; rather, they center
on a woman’s autonomy to determine her life’s course, and thus to
enjoy equal citizenship stature.71
As more and more legislation is enacted on the woman-protective model, the
question the Court took up glancingly in Carhart appears headed for judicial
resolution in the near future.
IV. CODA
The Court’s liberal Justices have now begun to reason about abortion by appeal
to the authority of the Equal Protection Clause. The question is whether Justice
Kennedy might ever be moved to do so. James Bopp, Jr., longtime lawyer for the
National Right to Life Committee (and architect of Citizens United72), has urged
antiabortion advocates to challenge Roe incrementally and cautioned against
pressing personhood amendments or other absolute restrictions on abortion; in
Bopp’s view, a constitutional challenge to a personhood amendment might provide
the occasion for Justice Kennedy to endorse Justice Ginsburg’s understanding of
the abortion right.73 In a strategy memo to the antiabortion movement, Bopp
warned:
But if the U.S. Supreme Court, as presently constituted, were to
actually accept a case challenging the declared constitutional right to
abortion, there is the potential danger that the Court might actually
make things worse than they presently are. The majority might abandon
its current “substantive due process” analysis (i.e., reading
“fundamental” rights into the “liberty” guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment against infringement without due process) in favor of what
Justice Ginsberg [sic] has long advocated—an “equal protection”
analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment. In Gonzales v. Carhart, 127
S. Ct. 1610 (2007), the dissent, written by Justice Ginsberg [sic], in fact
did so. See id. at 1641 (Ginsberg [sic], J., joined by Stevens, Souter,
and Breyer, JJ.) (“[L]egal challenges to undue restrictions on abortion
procedures do not seek to vindicate some generalized notion of privacy;
rather, they center on a woman’s autonomy to determine her life’s
course, and thus to enjoy equal citizenship stature.”). . . . A law
prohibiting abortion would force Justice Kennedy to vote to strike

71. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 171–72 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
72. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). James Bopp, Jr., has served as general
counsel for the National Right to Life Committee since 1978. NRLC General Counsel James
Bopp Named Republican Lawyer of the Year, NAT’L RIGHT TO LIFE NEWS, Sept. 2009, at 8.
Bopp represented Citizens United as the initial lawyer in their campaign finance law
challenge, initiating—but ultimately not arguing—the 2010 Supreme Court case. See David
D. Kirkpatrick, A Quest to End Spending Rules for Campaigns, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2010, at
A11.
73. See Siegel, supra note 44, at 1734–35, 1779–80 (discussing the liberal Justices’
understanding of the abortion right as grounded in autonomy and equality values, Justice
Kennedy’s potential adoption of this understanding, and Bopp’s strategic caution).
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down the law, giving Justice Ginsberg [sic] the opportunity to rewrite
the justification for the right to abortion for the Court. This is highly
unlikely in a case that decides the constitutionality of such things as
PBA bans, parental involvement laws, women’s right-to-know laws,
waiting periods, and other legislative acts that do not prohibit abortion
in any way, since Justice Kennedy is likely to approve such laws.74
Like Justice Ginsburg, James Bopp believes that an abortion right expressly and
textually anchored in the Equal Protection Clause would be much harder to
disentrench.
On the eve of Roe’s fortieth anniversary we do not yet know the decision’s fate.
However the Court decides the question, it is not likely to settle the abortion
question for this generation.
And should the abortion question one day find settlement, even that would not
be likely to settle the woman question, for generations to come.

74. Legal Memorandum from James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, Attorneys at Law,
on Pro-life Strategy Issues 3–4 (Aug. 7, 2007) (emphasis added), available at
http://operationrescue.org/pdfs/Bopp%20Memo%20re%20State%20HLA.pdf.

